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Current Abortion Laws: Proposals
and Movements for Reform
B. James George, Jr.
Criminal statutes and administrative sanctions regulating abortion
practices have continually provoked controversy because of the conflict-
ing social, religious, and medical interests which must be considered.
Professor George examines the effect of current state abortion statutes
and demonstrates their inadequacy in meeting present-day problems. He
considers present law unnecessarily strict in light of the tendency of cer-
tain women to have sexual relations regardless of legal controls or un-
pleasant, but remote, physical consequences. The author concludes by
proposing three methods of reform: (1) procedural changes to minimize
criminal prosecutions; (2) expansion of the scope of justifiable thera-
peutic abortions; and (3) liberalization of licensing statutes regulating
doctors and hospitals.
T~ AWS REGULATING sexual behavior have no peer at stirring
up intense emotional reaction; and when the element of life it-
self is involved, the reaction is compounded. Abortion is perhaps
the only problem in which attitudes toward sexual activity itself and
toward life and being are in
THE AUTHOR (B.A., J.D., University of seething turmoil. This tur-
Michigan) is a Professor of Law at
the University of Michigan. Professor moil is reflected in existing
George is currently serving as co-reporter legislation and constitutes the
for the Committee to Revise the Crim-
inal Code of ichigan. controlling element whenever
legislative or judicial changes
in existing law are proposed. Although the specifics of the conflict
are usually the details of statutory language, the real disagreement
arises over which interests are of primary importance and how these
interests are to be effectuated by law.
I. CONFLICTING INTERESTS AFFECTED BY ABORTION
LEGISLATION
There appear to be four foci for a discussion of the interests af-
fected by abortion. The first of these is the fetus itself. Concern
for the fetus is generally based upon one of two theories. One is
that there is life in being from the time of fertilization of the ovum,
and that this life, as any other life, is inviolate. The strongest ad-
herence to this view is of course within the Roman Catholic faith,
which condemns abortion under all circumstances;1 but there is also
I Canon 2350, § 1. See 8 AUGUSTINE, COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW 397-402
(1931); 3 BouscAREN, CANON LAw DIGEsr 669-70 (1954); 2 WOYwOD, PRAcTI-
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strong Protestant support for the idea.2 The second theory is
that the fate of the fetus, if it goes to term, should be taken into ac-
count. If the child will be born deformed, mentally defective, or
otherwise incapable of living a normal life, or if it will be born into
a highly detrimental environment, which cannot be reasonably com-
pensated for,8 it is preferable that its incipient life be nipped in the
bud. This premise is likely to be an incidental argument to advo-
cacy of liberalized abortion based on social need. Adoption of the
first view of fetal life means rejection of all abortion, or any abor-
tion unnecessary to save the life of the mother;4 to adopt the second
is usually to favor abortion in at least some situations.
The second focus is the pregnant woman. Most of the proposi-
tions advanced on this point are basically favorable to her position.
The only exception is the argument that pregnancy is the result of
intercourse which itself is licit only if done within marriage and for
procreation.5 Therefore, if the woman becomes pregnant it is both
her misfortune and her fulfillment of Divine mandate, and she must
carry the child, whatever the consequences. This exception aside,
most statements of policy are sympathetically inclined toward the
pregnant woman, although these do not necessarily favor abortion.
The most obvious point of concern is for her life, because there are
medical indications that she may not survive a pregnancy,' because
she may commit suicide if she is not permitted to have an abortion,'
CAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAw 545-46 (Smith rev. 1948). Also
important is the Papal Encyclical of Pius XI, CASTI CONtIJI (ON CHRISTIAN MAR-
RIAGE) (Dec. 31, 1930), particularly the portion reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF AMER-
ICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 132, 149-51 (Sayre ed.
1950).
2 E.g., THmIcKE, THE ETHICS OF SEX 226-47 (Doberstein trans. 1964).
3 Dahlberg, Abortion, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 379, 389 (Slovenko
ed. 1965).
4 THIELICKE, op. cit. supra note 2.
5 For an interpretation of Saint Augustine's view of sexual relations not too far from
this, see BROMLEY, CATHOLICS AND BIRTH CONTROL 9-15 (1965).
6 With advances in medical knowledge, there are probably fewer instances now than
formerly in which the woman is not likely to survive pregnancy. See Guttmacher,
Abortion Laws Make Hypocrites of Us All, 4 NEW MEDICAL MATERIA 56 (1962);
Hall, Therapeutic Abortion, Sterilization, and Conception, 91 AMERICAN J. OBSTET-
RICS & GYNECOLOGY 518 (1965); Russell, Therapeutic Abortions in California in
1950, 60 WESTERN J. SURGERY 497 (1952). The hypothetical cases used in the sur-
vey reported in Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medi-
cine, 11 STAN. L. REV. 417, 431-44 (1959), include several in which the life of the
mother might well be shortened if the pregnancy is carried to completion.
7 This is not a particularly high statistical probability. Bolter, The Psychiatrist's
Role in Therapeutic Abortion: The Unwitting Accomplice, 119 AMERICAN J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 312 (1962); Rosenberg & Silver, Suicide, Psychiatrists and Therapeutic Abor-
tion, 102 CALIF. MEDICINE 407 (1965).
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or because she may die at the hands of an untrained abortionist if
she is denied the facilities of a reputable hospital or clinic.' All of
these factors tend to favor liberalized abortion laws. A further con-
cern is for the pregnant woman's health, either physical or mental.'
Most of these arguments support a broadening of abortion laws,
except perhaps the one which asserts that the abortion works ir-
reparable psychological harm to the woman,"0 and therefore should
be restricted or prohibited.
A third focus is the family unit of which the pregnant woman
is a part and into which the new baby will be born. At times the
concern is for the freedom of the sexual partners to decide whether
and when they will have children." At other times the emphasis
is placed on the economic well-being of the whole family, which
may be adversely affected if the same resources must be stretched
to care for another member, or on the mother's care of the living
siblings, which might be detrimentally affected.' A person who
emphasizes these factors is almost certain to favor liberal abortion,
particularly that approved and administered through medical chan-
nels.
The final focus is on the needs of the community. Any of the
concerns already listed can of course be restated in terms of social
interests (e.g., protection of the life of fetus or mother, protection
8 Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AmmRicAN J. PUBLIC
HEATIH 948 (1960); Culiner, Some Medical Aspects of Abortion, 10 J. FORENSIC
MEDICINE 9, 12 (1963).
) In addition to the sources cited supra notes 6 and 7, see Kummer, Post-Abortion
Psychiatric Illiness - A Myth?, 119 AmRicAN J. PsYcHI.TRY 980 (1963); Moore
& Randall, Trends in Therapeutic Abortion: A Review of 137 Cases, 63 AMERICAN
J. OBnmmics & GYNECOLOGY 28, 38-40 (1952).
10 The Kinsey study does not particularly bear this out. GEBHARD, POMBROY,
MARTN & CmsRTENsON, PREGNANCY, BrTH AND ABORTION 208-11 (1958).
11 "Is it not time ... that we matured sufficiently as a people to assert once and
for all that the sexual purposes of human beings and their reproductive consequences
are not the business of t e state, but rather free decisions to be made by husband and
wife?" Rabbi Israel Margolies, quoted in Hall, Thalidomide and Our Abortion Laws,
6 COLUMBIA UNIVERS=TY FORUM 10, 13 (1963). See also FLETCHER, MORA.LS AND
MEDIcNE 92-99 (Beacon Press ed. 1960).
12Only Japan appears to embody this specifically in its statute. Art. 3(5) of the
Eugenic Protection Iaw (Law No. 156 of 1948; RoPPo ZENSHO 1778 [1965 ed.)
permits a discretionary abortion "if there are several children and the mother's health
will be seriously impaired if she again delivers." Art. 14 permits a doctor empowered
by a district medical association to terminate a pregnancy, in his discretion and with
the consent of both husband and wife, for several reasons, including the likelihood of
substantial injury to the mother's health for either physical or economic reasons if the
pregnancy continues to term. (Author's translation and paraphrase). Some Scandin-
avian laws go almost this far. Clemmesen, State of Legal Abortion in Denmark, 112
AMmucAN 3. PSYCHIATRY 662 (1956); Klintskog, Survey of Legislation on Legal
Abortion in Europe and North America, 21 MEDIcO-LEGAL J. 79 (1953).
19651
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
of the health of the mother, or protection of the viable family unit),
and all of them certainly have this dimension. But there are at least
two other concerns evident. One is the factor of population control.
Abortion is clearly one means of birth control, albeit a much less satis-
factory method than mechanical or chemical means of contraception.
In only one country, Japan, does the primary function of the statutes
which liberalize abortion appear to be population limitation, and
that is because of the traditional belief in Japan that contraceptives
are not used by proper married couples;'" the same attitudes do not
apply to the practice of abortion. As contraception becomes
more generally accepted among younger couples, as seems to be
the case,' 4 the population-control function of abortion in Japan
will probably decline to about the same level as in Western coun-
tries. Some writers suggest that there may be an impermissible ex-
ercise of state power inherent in any legal use of abortion as a means
of population control, " or that there may be too serious a decline
in population to permit the state to survive.'6 In general, however,
population control is only incidental to the practice of abortion and
is not a primary objective;' 7 thus abortion poses no major threat
either to private liberties or to population.
The other social factor is the freedom of the medical profession
to handle the abortion problem as it would any other medical prob-
lem - free from arbitrary legal controls.'" This factor is usually ad-
vanced in support of relaxed abortion laws.
While not necessarily a complete listing of the various policy
interests which are affected by and affect the coverage of the abor-
tion statutes, this discussion summarizes the major policy arguments
advanced in the debate over abortion legislation. How they are
reflected in current legislation is another matter.
13 see BEARDSLEY, HALL & WARD, VILLAGE JAPAN 335,36 (1959).
14 DORE, CITY LIFE IN JAPAN 205, 451 n.196 (1958).
15 See THIELICKE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 215-25.
16 This factor may account for the rescission of the law permitting easy abortion
in the U.S.S.R. See WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
219-20, 224 (1957). This rescission in turn seems to have been modified, however.
See GEBHARD, POMEROY, MARTIN & CISTENSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 218.
17 Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population Control in the United
States, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 593, 597-98 (1960); Tietze, The Current Status
of Fertility Control, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 426, 442-44 (1960).
18 Cf. Hall, Therapeutic Abortion, Sterilization, and Contraception, 91 AMERICAN
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 518, 522 (1965); Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abor-
tion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 So. CAL. L. REv. 123, 138-39 (1962).
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I. LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION PRACTICES
A. Criminal Statutes
(1) Statutes Penalizing Abortion.-Criminal statutes outlawing
abortion are of relatively recent vintage;' " there is so little common
law authority covering abortion that it plays no significant role in
evaluating the legality of abortion."0 The statutes may be roughly
classified as those which, in form, prohibit all abortions and those
which permit some abortions under carefully limited circumstances.
The statutes in four states - Louisiana,21 Massachusetts,22 New
Jersey,2" and Pennsylvania24 - provide no specific exceptions to the
general prohibition against abortion. In Massachusetts, however,
the Supreme Judicial Court by judicial construction has added a
limitation in favor of a physician who acts in the honest belief that
the operation is necessary to save the woman from great peril to
her life or health, if his judgement corresponds "with the average
judgment of the doctors in the community in which he practices."25
In New Jersey the Supreme Court apparently agreed that a doctor
can act to save the life of the mother, although it did not agree that
he could act merely to protect her health. " In New Hampshire
19 Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. J.
395, 431-38 (1961); WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 152-56.
20 Most common law cases reach only conduct which causes a miscarriage of a preg-
nant woman after the fetus has quickened. PERKINS, CpMuNAL LAw 101 (1957).
This rules out most abortions, which must be performed within the first trimester of
pregnancy if there is not to be serious danger to the pregnant woman.
2 1 LA. REV. STAT, § 14:87 (Supp. 1964). The only intent required is the intent
to procure premature delivery of the embryo or fetus. There is internal inconsistency
in Louisiana statutes, however, in that the statement of causes for revocation of a medi-
cal license, in LA. REv. STAT. § 37:1285 (1964), includes:
Procuring, aiding or abetting in procuring an abortion unless done for the
relief of a woman whose life appears in peril after due consultation with an-
other licensed physician....
If both are considered in Pari materia, Louisiana law is in accord with the majority of
states, as listed in note 31 infra.
2 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 272, § 19 (1956).
2 3 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1953). The statute reads "without lawful justifica-
tion"; nothing in the license revocation statute, N.J. REv. STAT. § 45:9-16 (1963),
provides any due to what may be lawful justification. See, however, the case cited
infra note 26.
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4718 (1963). The only qualification is "unlawfully";
there is no elaboration in the licensing statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 271 (1959).
On Pennsylvania law, see Trout, Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP.
L.Q. 172, 184-86 (1964).
2 5 Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 677, 171 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1961).
Apparently some consultation is required.
20 State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L 124, 58 A.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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and South Carolina, the statutes prohibiting attempted abortion 7
provide no exception, although the statutes penalizing actual abor-
tion' do justify acts necessary to save the mother's life.29 In North
Carolina there is a similar discrepancy between the sections on abor-
tion and those on using drugs or instruments with intent to produce
a miscarriage.30
In all the other states, the legislatures have specifically provided
for certain instances in which abortions may be legally performed.
In forty-six states3' and the District of Columbia,3" an abortion is
permissible if it is necessary to save the life of the mother. How-
ever, there is a wide variation in the details of how the exception is
to be administered.
One difference is in the matter of who is to be permitted to per-
form an abortion done to save the pregnant woman's life. Thirty-
2 7 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 585:12 (1955) (attempts to procure miscarriage);
S.C. CODE § 16-83 (1962) (attempted abortion; the catchline "abortion or attempted
abortion not resulting in death" is a misnomer).
2 8N.H. STAT. ANN. 5 585:13 (1955) ("unless, by reason of some malformation
or of difficult or protracted labor, it shall have been necessary, to preserve the life of the
woman... ."); S.C. CODE § 16-82 (1962).
29 The South Carolina statute justifies acts necessary to save the child's life as well.
3 0 N.C. GEM. STAT. §§ 14.44, 14.45 (1953).
3 1
a A. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962); ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); Aax. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1964); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 274; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23 (1964); CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 53-29
(1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §5 782.10, 797.01
(1965); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, -1103 (1953); HAwA w REV. LAWS §5 309-3,
-4 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1
(Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); IowA CODE ANN. § 701.1
(1950); KAN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 31-410 (Supp. 1963) (this is a manslaughter stat-
ute; there is no abortion statute as such unless it be § 31-409); KY. REV. STAT. §
436.020 (1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 51 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 3 (1957); MicHL STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18
(1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §5 28-404, -405
(1965); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:13
(1955) (abortion of quick child); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1, -3 (1964); N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 80-81, N.Y. REV. PEN. LAw § 125.05, 125A0-.55; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-44 (1953) (and see the text accompanying note 30 supra); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-25-01 (1943); OiO REV. CODE § 2901.16; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 5 861
(Supp. 1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1964) (but see text accompanying notes
46 and 85 infra); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1957); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82
(1962) (see text accompanying notes 27-29 supra); S.D. CODE § 13.3101 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. 5 39-301 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1191 (1961);
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 76-2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1959); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1956); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 5923 (1961); WS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958); Wo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77
(1959).
32D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961).
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one states3 appear to permit anyone to perform the operation, but
eleven require that it be done by a physician or surgeon."' The Mis-
souri statute seems to favor the unlicensed person. There, an abor-
tion is unlawful unless necessary to preserve the woman's life or that
of her unborn child. However, if the person who performs the abor-
tion "is not a duly licensed physician," the abortion is lawful if "the
said act has been advised by a duly licensed physician to be necessary
for such a purpose."3" Thus, while the licensed physician is held to
a standard of "objective necessity" for abortions he performs, the un-
licensed person apparently is justified in acting upon the advice of a
licensed physician, whether or not the abortion is objectively neces-
sary.
A second point of difference turns on whether necessity is to be
determined on an objective, or strict liability, basis or whether the
important thing is the good faith belief that necessity exists. Thirty
statutes, in form, support an, interpretation that necessity is an ob-
jective element of the crime,"m although five of them have been in-
terpreted to include, as a defense, good faith belief of necessity de-
spite their strict wording to the contrary.3" The harshness of these
statutes is also modified to a degree if, as in some of these jurisdic-
tions, the burden is on the state to prove the lack of necessity.3" In
3 3 Ala. (but see the license revocation statute, ALA. CODE tit. 46, 5 270 (1959)),
Alaska, Ariz., Conn., Del., Hawaii ("surgeon or other person"), Idaho, Ind., Iowa,
Ky., Me., Mich., Minn., Mont, Neb., Nev., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., R.I., S.C., S.D.,
Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va., Wyo. The statutes are cited note 31 supra.
34 D.C., Ark., Colo., Ill., Md., Miss., Mo., N.M., N.Y. (Revised Penal Law; the
present statute, in effect through Aug. 31, 1967, is not so limited), Ore. (though the
statutes are internally inconsistent, see the text accompanying notes 41-42 infra), Wis.
The statutes are cited notes 31-32 supra.
85Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953).
3 6 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Md. (good faith
belief no defense: Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556 (1951)), Me. (good
faith belief no defense: State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 Ad. 817 (1927)), Mich.,
Minn., Mo. (but see the text accompanying note 35 supra), Mont., Nev., N.Y. (but
see Revised Penal Law), N.C., N.D. (good faith belief no defense: State v. Shortridge,
54 N.D. 779, 211 N.W. 336 (1926)), Okla., Ore., R.I., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt., Wash.,
Wyo. The statutes are cited note 31 supra.
87 Steed v. State, 27 Ala. App. 263, 170 So. 489 (1936) (semble) (a woman who
consents to an abortion is an accomplice, unless she does so under an honest belief that
the abortion is necessary to save her own life); People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d
803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959); State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592
(1928); Honnard v. People, 77 Ill. 481 (1875); State v. Elliott, 234 Ore. 522, 383
P.2d 382 (1963); "From the statute it is dear that there is to be established for con-
viction a specific intent to destroy the unborn child, and no intent to preserve the life
of the mother." Id. at 528, 383 P.2d at 385.
38 See the text accompanying notes 123-28 infra.
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ten states and the District of Columbia,39 however, the statutes make
it dear that it is the motivation and not the objective necessity which
constitutes the basis for the exception from coverage. The new
New York Revised Penal Law takes an intermediate position by re-
quiring that the belief be "reasonable" when a duly licensed physi-
cian performs the abortion.4°
A final point of difference is whether prior consultation with
one or more physicians is necessary before a claim of justification
can be made. In thirteen states4 the abortion statute itself requires
advice or consultation, while in three others42 the same thing is ac-
complished through statutes governing revocation of licenses to prac-
tice medicine. In other states, the fact of consultation presumably
has no legal relevance, although it probably determines whether any
criminal prosecution is ever brought against a doctor who performs
an abortion after regular hospital consultation.
A few states provide broader statements of justification. Seven
states43 permit abortions to preserve the life of the unborn child.
This qualification probably has no functional effect other than to
make it clear that induced labor is not a violation of the criminal law.
Since a fetus has little chance of survival if it is born before the
seventh month of gestation, and since most medically justified abor-
tions are performed within the first trimester of pregnancy, the limi-
tation has no very great impact on the abortion problem as such, and
serves only to remove any hypothetical bars to legitimate obstetrics
practice. A few statutes grant an even broader license to per-
form abortions when they are necessary to prevent serious and
permanent bodily injury44 or to protect the health of the mother.45
3 9 Ark., Colo., Hawaii, Miss., N.M., Tenn., Tex., Va., W. Va. The statutes are cited
notes 31, 32 supra.
4 0 N.Y. REV. PEN. LAw § 125.05 (3).
41 Ark. (§ 41-2224 only), Fla., Ga., Kan., Md., Miss., Mo. (non-physician only),
Neb., Nev., N.M., Ohio, Tex., Wis. The statutes are cited note 31 supra. See also the
consultation element in Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850
(1961).
4 2 ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 270 (Supp. 1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285
(1964); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 677.190 (medical doctor), 681.140 (osteopath) (1963),
and see State v. Buck, 200 Ore. 87, 262 P.2d 435 (1953).
43 Conn., Minn., Mo., Nev., N.Y. (but not under the Revised Penal Law), S.C.,
Wash. The statutes are cited note 31 supra.
44 Colo., N.M. The statutes are cited note 31 supra.
45D.C., Ala. The statutes are cited notes 31, 32 supra. The Oregon licensing
statute, note 42 supra, uses the phrase "health in peril." Whether the Maryland statute,
cited note 31 supra, belongs in this category depends on what interpretation is placed
on the clause "satisfied . . . that no other method will secure the safety of the mother."
No Maryland decision provides an answer.
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Massachusetts, as indicated above,46 has accomplished the same thing
by judicial decision. This permits a more normal medical determi-
nation to be made than is the case when necessity to preserve the
life of the woman is the requirement.
The old common law requirement that the child be quick before
there could be a criminal abortion has disappeared from the statute
law. This is most commonly achieved by referring to pregnancy;
thirty-two states utilize this approach.4 Five other states4" specify
that quickening does not matter, usually through the phrase
"whether quick or not." In the remaining states, this matter is re-
solved by the statutory provisions dealing with the attempt problem,
discussed immediately below. The fact of quickening, however, is
determinative of the severity of the punishment in ten states.49
Additional problems arise when, despite the effort to abort the
woman, no miscarriage is in fact brought about. This may be either
because the abortion operation is bungled or because the woman is
not pregnant. Forty-one states eliminate the first problem by penal-
izing the use of instruments, the administration of drugs, or the use
of any other means intended to produce an abortion;5" Texas has a
special attempt statute. 1 If the woman is not pregnant, however, it
might be argued that the crime was "impossible" to attempt.52 Sev-
eral states eliminate this as a possibility either by covering the doing
of the prohibited acts to "any woman,"53 to a woman "whether
4 6 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
47 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Colo. ("then being with child"), Del., Ga., Hawaii ("with
child"), Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky. ("at any time during the period of gestation"), La.
(LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (1964), Md. ("at any period of pregnancy"), Mich.,
Miss., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.C., N.D., Okla., Ore., S.C. ("with
child"), S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Wyo. Except as otherwise indicated, the statutes are
cited note 31 supra.
4 8 Ark., Ky., Me., Neb., Tenn. The statutes are cited note 31 supra.
4 9 Fla., Hawaii, Kan., N.H., N.Y., N.D., Okla., Pa. (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719
(1963)), S.C., Wis. Except as otherwise indicated, the statutes are cited note 31 supra.
5 0 D.C., Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., FIa (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 797.01
(1965)), Ga., Idaho, Mll., Ind., Iowa (under an "attempt" catchline), Kan., Ky., La.
(LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87 (1950)), Me., Mass. (MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §
19 (1956)) Mich., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.H. ("attempt" catchline), N.J.
(N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1951)), N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn.
("attempt" catchline), Utah, Va., Wash., W. Va., Wyo. Except as otherwise indicated,
the statutes are cited notes 31, 32 supra.
51 T. PEN. CoDE art. 1193 (1961) ("provided it be shown that such means were
calculated to produce that result....")
52 See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 489-94 (1957). Cf. Dupuy v. State, 204 Tenn.
624, 325 S.W.2d 238 (1959).
5 3 Ten jurisdictions use this language: D.C., Cal., Fla., Iowa, Mass. (MAsS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1956)), Ohio, Pa. (PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719
(1963)), Va., Wash., W. Va. Except as otherwise indicated, the statutes are cited notes
1965]
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pregnant or not,"54 or to a woman believed by the defendant to be
pregnant."s Several decisions support the idea that under statutes
like these the victim need not be pregnant." In two states, however,
punishment varies according to whether or not a miscarriage is ac-
tually produced. "7
(2) Statutes Prohibiting Killing an Unborn Quick Child.-
Eight states make it a separate offense wilfully to kill an unborn
quick child under circumstances in which, if the mother and not the
fetus had been killed, it would have been murder.5" The aim of
these statutes is not entirely dear from either the language or the
interpreting cases, but their target is probably the person who in-
tends to cause a pregnant woman to abort without her consent and
who uses physical violence against her body to achieve the purpose.
Conceptually these statutes dearly accord independent personality
to the fetus, for the killing of the fetus under these circumstances is
called manslaughter; and the sections themselves are usually found
with the other homicide sections.
(3) Statutes Penalizing Death of the Pregnant Woman Result-
ing from Abortion.-If a pregnant woman dies as the result of an
abortion, there should be little difficulty in establishing either
(a) second degree murder, based either on felony murder in the
context of commission of a felony not enumerated in the first-degree
murder statute, the intentional infliction of great bodily injury, or
the performance of an act with known dangerous consequences, or
31, 32 supra. There is some internal inconsistency in the Virginia and West Virginia
statutes which speak of "intent to destroy her unborn child," and the woman was preg-
nant in the reported cases. E.g., Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 58 S.E.2d
72 (1950); Coffman v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 553, 50 S.E.2d 431 (1948); but the
exact question has not apparently been presented for decision.
54 Ill. ("it shall not be necessary in order to commit abortion that such woman be
pregnant. . ."), Mo., N.Y. (in both N.Y. Penal Law and N.Y. Rev. Penal Law). The
statutes are cited note 31 supra.
55 Ind. ("whom he supposes to be pregnant"), Ky. ("has reason to believe preg-
nant"), R.I. ("woman supposed by such person to be pregnant"), Vt. (same), Wyo.
("whom he supposes to be pregnant"). The statutes are cited note 31 supra.
50E.g., People v. Kutz, 187 Cal. App. 2d 431, 9 Cal. Rep. 626 (1960); Urga v.
State, 155 So. 2d 719 (Fla. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 829 (1964); Wyatt v.
State, 77 Nev. 490, 367 P.2d 104 (1961).
57 Ky., Me. The statutes are cited note 31 supra.
58 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (1964); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (1965); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 21-409 (1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. S 28.554 (1962); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 2223 (1957); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1050(2) (this is not carried as such into the
Revised Penal Law); N.D. REv. CODE § 12-25-06 (1960) (semble); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, 5 713 (1961).
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(b) manslaughter, based on gross criminal negligence." Several
states, however, meet the problem directly in the context of the
abortion statutes by providing for increased punishment for abor-
tion if the woman dies as a result of the abortion," or by character-
izing the death as either murder,61 manslaughter,' or assault with
intent to murder. 3
(4) Statutes Penalizing the Woman Who Seeks an Abortion.-
Absent a specific statute, a woman who seeks or submits to an abor-
tion is usually not considered to be an accomplice to the abortion."
Rhode Island65 and Vermont66 preserve this doctrine by statute, and
the Reporter's Comment to the Louisiana statute' indicates that
there is no intent to change the earlier Louisiana case law to the
same effect.
In several states, however, the legislature has decreed that the
5 9 Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 CoLum. L. REV.
701, 702-23 (1937).
6 0 Mass. (MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1956)), NJ. (N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:87-1 (1951)), N.M., R.I., S.C., (S.C. CODE § 16-82 (1962)), Vt. Except as
otherwise indicated, the statutes are cited note 31 supra.
O1D.C. (second-degree murder), Colo., Ky. (KY. REv. STAT. § 435.040 (1962))
("murder or voluntary manslaughter, as the facts may justify"), Miss., N.H. (N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 585.14 (1955)) (second-degree murder), Tex. (TEx. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 1194 (1961)), W. Va. Except as otherwise cited, the statutory references
are found at notes 31, 32 supra.
62 Alaska, Fla., Kan. (KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-410 (1964)) (manslaughter
in the first degree), Mich., Mo., N.Y. (N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW § 125.20) (manslaughter
in the first degree), N.D. (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-02 (1960) (manslaughter in
the first degree), Ore. Statutes not cited here are found in note 31 supra.
6 3GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1403 (1953).
6 4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 Mass. 274, 29 N.E. 471 (1892);
Petition of Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 123 N.W.2d 253 (1963) (woman cannot claim
self-incrimination); In re Vince, 2 NJ. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949) (issue of self-incrim-
ination; the woman is not incriminated unless the fetus has quickened, in which case
the offense is against the fetus and not the mother); State v. Shaft, 166 N.C. 407, 81
S.E. 932 (1914); Smartt v. State, 112 Tenn. 539, 80 S.W. 586 (1904); Willingham
v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 98, 25 S.W. 424 (1894). Contra, Steed v. State, 27 Ala. App.
263, 170 So. 489 (1936); State v. McCoy, 52 Ohio St. 157, 39 N.E. 316 (1894). Iowa
has held that even though she is not an accomplice, she can become guilty of a con-
spiracy by agreeing to have the operation performed upon herself. State v. Crofford,
133 Iowa 478, 110 N.W. 921 (1907). In that case she was not charged (she had
died as a result of the abortion) and the theory was used to make her statements admis-
sible as a declaration in promotion of the common enterprise. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has said that the woman cannot be guilty of conspiracy, since she is the
victim. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 398 Pa. 237, 246, 157 A.2d 207, 212 (1960).
651R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-3-1 (1957).
66 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1959).
67 L _ REV. STAT. ANN. 14:87 (1964).
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woman commits a criminal act by soliciting or submitting to an
abortion. 8
These statutes seem to have two significant legal effects, and
probably one practical effect as well. First, they are often accom-
panied by statutes requiring the woman's testimony to be corrobo-
rated,"9 or are held by judicial construction to require corrobora-
tion."° Second, the fact that the woman is deemed to have com-
mitted a criminal act means that the woman may claim privilege
when she is summoned to testify for the state."' However, because
of the importance, in many instances, of the woman's testimony in
establishing the abortionist's guilt, legislatures have had to pro-
vide either that the privilege against self-incrimination does not ap-
ply72 or that immunity against prosecution is conferred upon the
woman when she testifies for the state." This brings the matter
around full circle to about where it would be if the woman were not
considered a criminal in the first place."m
In addition to these two legal problems created by criminal sanc-
tions against the woman, there may be some slight practical advan-
tage to the prosecution in being able to coerce cooperation from the
woman by threatening to prosecute her if she does not cooperate,
while promising her immunity from prosecution if she cooperates.
(5) Statutes Penalizing Activity Which Facilitates Perform.
68 A=. R V. STAT. ANN. § 13-212 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 275; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53-30 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-602 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 10-106 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.19 (1964); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 81, N. Y.
REV. PEN. LAW §5 125.50, .55; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-04 (1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 862 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-84 (1962); S.D. CODE § 13.3102
(1939) (but see State v. Burlingame, 47 S.D. 332, 198 N.W. 824 (1924), which held
the woman not to be an accomplice under the abortion statute itself, § 13.3101); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-2 (1953) (but see State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P.2d 1071
(1934), in which it was held that this statute did not make her an accomplice under
the main abortion statute, § 76-2-1); WASH. REV. CODE 5 9.02.020 (1956); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-78 (1959).
69CAL. PEN. CODE § 1108; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2115 (1948); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-7216 (1949); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-07 (1960); S.C. CODE
55 16-82, 16-83 (1962).
7 0 People v. Peyser, 380 Ill. 404, 44 N.E.2d 58 (1942); State v. McCoy, 52 Ohio St.
157, 39 NE. 316 (1894).
71 See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207 (1960).
72 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.21 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.040 (1956).
Whether or not these statutes are consistent with the privilege against self-incrimination
embodied in the respective state constitutions, they appear clearly to be unconstitutional
as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process under Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1
(1964).
7 3 NEv. REv. STAT. 5 201.140 (1955); NJ. REv. STAT. § 2A:87-2 (1953); N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 81-a; OHIo REV. CODE § 2901.17; S.C. CODE ANN. 16-85 (1962).
74 See, e.g., Petition of Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 123 N.W.2d 253 (1963); In re
Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
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ance of Abortions.-A medical doctor who performs an abortion
utilizes instruments which are part of the regular equipment of any
gynecologist or obstetrician." It is not realistic to try to control
traffic in these instruments; in any event the very nature of the
channels which supply equipment to physicians and hospitals makes
it unlikely that a layman can casually purchase them. But self-in-
duced abortion is a major medical problem;7" and the devices or
chemical substances used for "do-it-yourself" abortion are sufficiently
identified, and probably with few other modern uses, that some ef-
fort at controlling them can be made. In any event, legislatures
have fairly consistently tried to regulate their availability.
Advertising abortifacients is penalized in twenty-seven jurisdic-
tions. In twenty-two of them there is a special statute covering the
abortifacient either alone or in the context of medicines preventing
conception, curing venereal disease, and the like,7" while in six juris-
dictions this sort of advertising is prohibited in the context of ob-
scenity." Whether these statutes are in fact invoked at the local
level is uncertain; there is a dearth of appellate opinion construing
them.
7 9
State legislation also frequently seeks to regulate the actual traf-
fic in abortifacients by prohibiting their manufacture,"0 transporta-
7 5 BATES & ZAWADsKI, CRIMINAL ABORTION 38-39 (1964).
761d. at 85-91.
7 7 Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-213 (1956); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 601;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 302 (1953);
FLA. STAT. § 797.02 (1965); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 155-73 (1955) (outdoor adver-
tising only); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-603 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-3
(Smith-Hurd 1964); INr. ANN. STAT. § 10-2806 (1956); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:88 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 53 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
3 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 20 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
28.223 (1962); Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.300 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4525
(1963); R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. § 11-3-4 (1957); S.D. CODE § 13.1508 (1939); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960); Wis. STAT. 5
143.075 (1963); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-105 (1959).
78D.C CODE ANN. § 22-2001 (1961); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-17
(1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2804 (1956); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21
(1956); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2289 (1957); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1142. (The Revised
Penal Law does not continue this and-does not transfer it to N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 12-d).
7 0 The author has found only two cases: People v. McKean, 76 Cal. App. 114, 243
Pac. 898 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 193 Mass. 464, 79 N.E.
784 (1907). See also Shapiro v. Board of Regents, 22 App. Div. 2d 243, 254 N.Y.S.2d
906 (1964), a license suspension case, which appears to stress the physician's misrep-
resentation or fraud rather than his offering to produce an abortion.
8 0 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.20
(1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.130 (1955); N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW § 125.60; WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.02.030 (1956).
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tion,8 ' distribution,82 furnishing,83 sale or keeping or exposing for
sale, 4 giving away," or lending. " Two states require that all sales
be on prescriptions which are then registered.87 Oregon penalizes
one who furnishes a place knowing that abortions, other than those
performed as therapeutic under the medical licensing statutes,)8 are
to be performed there."9 These statutes have produced no appel-
late litigation, but their fate may well be that of the federal
statutes which prohibit mailing, importing, and transporting various
kinds of "obscene" matter, including articles for "producing abor-
tion."9° The limited case law interpreting these sections in the con-
text of traffic in abortifacients9e ' suggests that so long as the sub-
stance sold or transported has a legitimate medical or commercial
use it will not in fact be effectively covered by the legislation.
B. Administrative Sanctions
Criminal penalties are blunt instruments with which to regulate
human conduct. More efficient control can often be maintained
through granting and revoking special licenses to engage in a busi-
ness or profession, or by imposing administrative fines or penalties;
many aspects of prostitution are controlled primarily in this way."
8 1 
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2804 (1956).
82 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (other than to a licensed
physician); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:88 (1951).
83 TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1192 (1961) (treated as accomplice).
84 D.C. CODE § 22-2001 (1961); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-17 (ob-
scenity statute), 66-3-65 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, 5 23-2 (Smith-
Hurd 1964); IowA CODE ANN. § 205.51 (1949) (other than on prescription); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1956);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.205 (1962) (except on prescription); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5
617.20 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2289 (1957); Mo. REv. STAT. § 563.300
(1959); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.130 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. S 11-3-4 (1957);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, S 104 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.030 (1956).
85 D.C. CODE § 22-2001 (1961) (obscenity statute); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5
40-9-17 (1964) (obscenity statute); IowA CODE ANN. 5 205.1 (1949); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, S 21 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.20 (1964); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2289 (1957) (obscenity statute); Mo. REV. STAT. 5 563.300 (1959); NEv.
REV. STAT. 5 201.130 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104 (1959); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.02.030 (1956).
86 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. S 40-9-17 (1964) (obscenity statute); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1956); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2289 (1957) (obscenity
statute).
87 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 66-3-66 (1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. S 28.205 (1962).
88 ORE. REV. STAT. § § 677.190 (physicians and surgeons), 681.140 (osteopaths)
(1961).
89 ORE. REV. STAT. S 465.110 (1961).
90 18 U.S.C. §5 1461, 1462 (1964).
91Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930) (dictum).
92 George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerations in the Control of Prostitu-
tion, 60 MICH. L. REV. 717, 736-42 (1962).
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In the context of abortion, however, only licensed medical personnel
and hospitals are subject to control through administrative action; a
layman or a person with medical training whose license to practice
has been revoked can be reached only through criminal prosecution.
This does not mean, however, that licensing statutes and license revo-
cation proceedings are unimportant in the context of abortion con-
trol. The claim that an abortion is justified because it is necessary
to preserve the life, or the life or health, of the pregnant woman on
whom it is performed is either limited in law to, or asserted in fact
by, licensed medical personnel. Loss of a license to practice is such a
fearsome thing to a professional person that medical licensing
and license-revocation standards and procedures must be considered
as prime controls on the availability of therapeutic abortions.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions authorize revoca-
tion of a medical doctor's license when he has committed or partici-
pated in the commission of a criminal abortion." Two states pro-
vide for revocation of the license in the criminal provision itself.94
In most of these states the reference is to "criminal abortion" or
"unlawful abortion," which seems to mean that the administration
of the criminal law determines the administration of the medical
licensing law. But in three jurisdictions the licensing statute pro-
vides for therapeutic abortion procedures not referred to in the crimi-
nal statutes themselves.95 There is no case law reconciling the pos-
sible inconsistency between the sections; but where the legislature
93ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 270 (Supp. 1963); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 08.64.330, .380
(1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-613
(1957); CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2377; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-17 (1964);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1741 (Supp. 1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.12 (1965);
GA. CODE ANN, § 84-916 (Supp. 1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1810 (1957); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 5 23-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 147.55, .56
(1949); KY. REv. STA. § 311.595 (1963); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285 (1964);
D. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 145 (1957); Iir. CoMP. LAWS § 338.53 (Supp. 1963);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.02 (1946); Mss. CODE ANN. § 8893.1 (Supp. 1964); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-148 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.030- .300 (1963); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 45:9-16 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN, § 67-5-9 (1961); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
6514; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-31 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 509 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.190 (1963); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 410 (Supp. 1964); IRL GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37-4 (Supp.
1964); S.D. CODE § 27.0311 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-618, -619 (1955);
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT., arts. 4505, 06 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-18 (1963);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1398 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. 55 54-316, -317 (1958);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.71.120, .140, 1872.030 (1959); Wis. STAT. § 147.20
(1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-340 (1959).
9 4 ISS. CODE ANN. § 2223 (1957) ("The license of any physician or nurse shall
be automatically revoked upon conviction under the provisions of this act."); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 559.100 (1959).
95 Ala., Ia., Ore., dted note 42 stepra.
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has carefully spelled out in the licensing statute procedures for per-
forming a therapeutic abortion, it appears unlikely that a court
would hold that a doctor is guilty of a crime when he has complied
with specific statutory requirements. The specific should still con-
trol the general.
Performance of a criminal abortion is not mentioned as a ground
for revocation of a license in the laws of the remaining jurisdictions.
However, in these states there is statutory authorization for revoca-
tion based on conviction of a felony"6 or unprofessional conduct in
general.97 Since abortion has been denominated a form of unpro-
fessional conduct,98 it is clear that there is no state in which a proven
abortionist can continue to practice without his license being sub-
ject to revocation.
Many of the statutes cited above also list practitioners of the
healing arts other than medical doctors. Some jurisdictions, how-
ever, have enacted special statutes covering osteopaths,9 nurses, 100
midwives,' and other practitioners specially regulated by law.
10 2
Most revocation proceedings are carried on as a purely admin-
istrative matter, and are subject to review as are administrative pro-
ceedings in general. Reviewing decisions usually examine only
whether the administrative agency stayed within the proper limits of
discretion in determining that charges were properly laid and sub-
stantiated and that disciplinary penalties were properly assessed.0 3
There are, however, two questionable aspects of the use of license
96 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-131 (1961); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-45 (1960);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-1306 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, 5 3203 (1964);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:17 (Supp. 1963); OHIO REv. CODE 5 4731.22; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-1368 (1962) (conviction of "illegal practice" is also included; this
may well include abortion).
9 7 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 61 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
66-1004 (1947). This phrase is also included in the various statutes cited notes 93,
96 supra.
98 Lawrence v. Board of Registration, 239 Mass. 424, 132 N.E. 174 (1921); State
ex rel. Sorenson v. Lake, 121 Neb. 331, 236 N.W. 762 (1931); cf. Moormeister v. De-
partment of Registration, 76 Utah 146, 288 Pac. 900 (1930).
9 9 A1yAZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1854 (1956); ORE. REv. STAT. § 681.140 (1963).
100ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 32-1663 (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 35-46
(Smith-Hurd 1956); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2761 (nursing), 2878 (vocational
nursing).
01 COLO REv. STAT. ANN. 5 91-4-6 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3312 (1955);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 16a (Smith-Hurd 1956).
102 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 460.13 (chiropractor), 462.14 (naturopath) (1965);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 634.010 (1963) (chiropractor); N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 6514 (physi-
otherapy); ORE. REV. STAT. §5 684.100 (chiropractor), 685.110 (naturopath)
(1963).
103 See, e.g., Application of Jones, 4 App. Div. 2d 994, 168 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957).
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revocation procedures against professional persons who are alleged
to have committed criminal abortions. It has been held that license
revocation proceedings may be begun even though the statute of
limitations has run on a criminal prosecution""4 or the defendant has
been earlier acquitted in a criminal prosecution based on the same
act."0 5 Although, as a general matter, agencies which regulate pro-
fessions should be able to remove the unfit from practice whatever
may happen in specific criminal prosecutions or civil actions against
them, it is doubtful that a properly performed abortion creates any
medical problem as such or reflects adversely in any way on the level
of professional skill of the person who performs it. Therefore, to
revive an outlawed transaction or to proceed despite an acquittal
looks as if the state is seeking again to exact retribution rather than
that the medical profession is endeavoring to protect the public
against an inept medical practitioner. In this context, it is in-
teresting to note that at least two states have held that revocation
of a license is a penalty which is outlawed by a statute conferring
immunity in return for incriminating testimony."'
The other questionable aspect is that it has been held that disci-
plinary proceedings may be carried through even though a pending
prosecution based on the same act of abortion has not reached final
disposition.' This places the respondent in the disciplinary proceed-
ings in a difficult position. He may assert, in good faith, the privilege
against self-incrimination in the disciplinary proceeding. 8 without
being disciplined for his refusal to testify, but this may well mean
that he will have his license revoked because he does not controvert
the testimony adduced by the grievance committee. On the other
hand, if he testifies in the license revocation matter, he may find
that, in fact, he provides useful information to the state which can
be used against him in the criminal prosecution as a party admission.
Under circumstances like these, the revocation proceedings have
104 Blumberg v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 96 N.J.L 331, 115 Atl. 439 (Sup.
Cr. 1922).
105 State v. Lewis, 164 Wis. 363, 159 N.W. 746 (1916); FLA. Ops. Arr'y GEN.
505, 509 (1962).
106 Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952)
(architects license); Malouf v. Gully, 187 Miss. 331, 192 So. 2 (1939) (liquor li-
cense).
107 F lorida State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. James, 158 So. 2d 574 (Fla. App.
1964).
I08 In re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353 (1922); Matter of Grae, 282 N.Y.
428, 26 NE.2d 963 (1940); Matter of Levy, 255 N.Y. 223, 174 N.E. 461 (1931).
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little claim to priority over the criminal prosecution, and probably
ought to be suspended until the outcome of the criminal case is clear.
C. Civil Responsibility
From time to time the question has arisen as to whether the
woman on whom an abortion has been performed, or her repre-
sentative if she is dead as a result of the operation, can sue civilly to
recover damages. If a court were disposed to deny recovery, it might
invoke the traditional concept that one cannot recover for injuries
arising from activities in which he voluntarily engaged (volenti non
fit injuria) or from activities which are by their nature "highly of-
fensive and injurious to society," ' 9 and are thus both immoral and
illegal. If, on the other hand, it were predisposed toward permit-
ting recovery, the court might hold that the state is wronged and,
therefore, permits the recovery in indirect enforcement of its poli-
cies" ° or that consent to the abortion is not consent to bungled
aftercare."'
As one might expect, the cases are not in agreement, although
something of a consistent pattern develops if one ascertains
(1) whether the action is against the doctor himself or the male
friend of the woman plaintiff who both made her pregnant and put
her in contact with the abortionist, (2) whether the woman is alive
or dead, and (3) whether death, if it occurred, stemmed from the
abortion itself or can be attributed to failure to provide adequate
aftercare when the woman was in a position of peril in which emer-
gency treatment by the physician might have been expected.
It seems unlikely that a woman will be permitted to maintain an
action against someone who cooperated with her in making contact
with the abortionist who performed the bungled operation.1 2 This
holding appears fair enough, since in fact the woman and her para-
mour were in trouble together and equally motivated to have the
abortion performed. There is, therefore, no good legal or practical
reason why he, rather than she, should bear the economic burden of
the aftermath of the abortion (at least as long as joint tortfeasors in
general cannot distribute losses among themselves) or why courts
109 Martin v. Morris, 163 Tenn. 186, 188, 42 S.W.2d 207 (1931).
1"°Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio St. 381, 388, 390, 144 N.E. 264, 267
(1924).
111 See the cases cited note 117 infra.
112 Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626, 271 P.2d 140 (1954); Goldnamer




should lend their aid to support a subsequent falling out between
the couple.
When the action is by the woman against the doctor, there is a
split of authority over whether any suit may be maintained. Two
cases deny the possibility of an inter vivos action no matter how
careless the doctor may have been;.. but other courts have permit-
ted the woman to recover," 4 at least to the extent of the injuries
actually suffered."'
If the woman has died from the abortion operation itself (as in
a case in which an embolism results from the insertion of instru-
ments into the uterus) or because of complications arising there-
after (like septicemia), it is possible that her survivors may com-
mence a wrongful death action, chiefly against the doctor. Only
two cases refuse to permit this action under these circumstances;...
the rest of the cases permit recovery." '  In these latter decisions it
is evident that if the courts can point to wilful or negligent failure
to provide adequate medical aftercare for the aborted woman
whom the defendant doctor knows to be in need of qualified medi-
cal attention, they find it easier to justify a recovery of damages than
they do if they must base recovery on the fact of the abortion itself.
This showing of subsequent neglect can probably be made in many
instances and is something which the plaintiff's attorney should keep
in mind as he presents his medical evidence.
Though some reservation has been expressed about permitting
civil recovery based on a bungled abortion under any circumstances
whatever," 8 there seems to be no special reason to treat this situa-
tion any differently than any other malpractice situation." 9 If a
doctor fails to provide the sort of aftercare which is expected accord-
ing to generally accepted medical standards, he ought to be liable
"3 Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273 (1934); Martin v. Morris, 163
Tenn. 186,42 S.W.2d 207 (1931).
114 Richey v. Darling, 183 Kan. 642, 331 P.2d 281 (1958).
15 Lembo v. Donnell, 117 Me. 143, 103 Atl. 11 (1918); Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis.
123, 68 N.W. 869 (1896).
116 Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 154 N.E. 251 (1926) (there is no indica-
tion in the report that the defendant was in fact a doctor; the negligence consisted of
using "non-sterile instruments"); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217
(1949).
117 Martin v. Hardesty, 91 Ind. App. 239, 163 N.E. 610 (1928); True v. Older,
227 Minn. 154, 34 N.W.2d 700 (1948); Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio St. 381,
144 N.E. 264 (1924); Henrie v. Griffith, 395 P.2d 809 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1964); An-
drows v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, 1 P.2d 320 (1931) (only for negligent aftercare,
not for the abortion itself).
11840 KY. J. 410, 414-15 (1952).
119 Cf. SHARTEL & PLANT, THE LAw OF MEDIcAL PRAcTIcE §§ 1-17, -18 (1959).
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in damages whether or not the original operation or technique is an
abortion. Holdings in line with the majority position not only pro-
mote higher standards of medical care in general, but serve also to
support any efforts which may be made to put control over thera-
peutic abortions primarily in the hands of the medical profession
itself. '2
III. TRENDS AND TECHNIQUES TOWARD LIBERALIZATION
Whether one stops at this point and rests content with a de-
scription of present statutes and case law, or proceeds to suggest
changes in the present law, depends on his basic attitude toward
abortion and on the policy considerations which he chooses to stress.
For some, the majority position, which permits abortion only to
save the life of the mother, is the most liberal that one can safely
take; no change is either needed or proper. For certain others, even
an exception in favor of saving the mother's life is intolerable; there
should be absolute prohibition of all abortions, whatever the circum-
stances. Roman Catholic writings come dose to advocating this
position.12' However, for many in law, medicine, and society in
general, the present law is unnecessarily strict and must be libera-
lized.
The author stands with the latter group; this, of course, dictates
in large measure the form and content of what follows, and slants
it considerably. The author prefers to make this dear, however,
rather than hiding behind a facade of objective legal scholarship.
Briefly stated, then, his premises are these: women cannot be de-
terred from having sexual relations, nor their partners motivated to
join them in abstinence, by the fear that if they become pregnant
they will have to carry a child to term, any more than they will be
deterred by being denied contraceptives or anaesthesia during child-
birth.' If they intend sexual relations, they will have them despite
legal controls or unpleasant but remote physical consequences. To
put it another way, proscribing abortion does not promote celibacy,
and liberalizing abortion does not promote promiscuity. Among
women, married and unmarried, who become pregnant, a certain
number will wish to be aborted. Those with money and connec-
tions will either find a compliant practitioner who will terminate
120 See the text accompanying notes 152-64 infra.
121 Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. .J. 173,
233-35 (1960); 39 NoTm DAME LAW. 310, 313-14 (1964).
122 WILLIAMS, THE SANCrITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 61-63 (1957).
[Vol. 17: 371
CURRENT ABORTION LAWS
the pregnancy safely, though not cheaply, or purchase a ticket
to a country in which an abortion can be performed openly. For
those without the means or the connections necessary to secure an
abortion in that way, the choice is less satisfactory. The mother may
have to carry the child to term; if so, it may not be born into a satis-
factory home or may not be adoptable. She may have to find an un-
qualified quack who butchers his patients, or she may have to try to
induce an abortion herself. Either of the latter routes poses an ab-
normally high statistical possibility of serious bodily injury, sterility,
or death. Though the community may encourage exhaustion of all
other alternatives before allowing abortion, it should facilitate per-
formance of abortions on women in aseptic clinics rather than in mo-
tels or filthy tenement rooms if it is in fact concerned about the life
and health of women who do not want to carry their pregnancies
to term. To accomplish this the present criminal law must be modi-
fied. There are three ways in which this might be achieved: (1)
adoption of procedural changes which make it difficult to con-
vict doctors who perform, in a hospital or clinic, dilitation and curet-
tage or other acceptable medical techniques to terminate a preg-
nancy; (2) embodiment in the criminal code provisions of much
broadened categories of therapeutic abortions, the performance of
which is exempted from criminal penalties; or (3) complete elimi-
nation of criminal law regulation of therapeutic abortions and
regulation of the practice by the medical profession itself.
A. Procedural Changes to Minimize Prosecutions
in Therapeutic Abortion Cases
It is easy to equate the fact of legislation with the fact of con-
trol, or to state it somewhat differently, to assume that by the act of
legislating the problem is solved. But in many circumstances it is
not so much the content of the statute which concludes the case as
it is the matter of who has the burden of proof. Therefore, enforce-
ment of inherited legal standards to prevent the gradual develop-
ment of medical and hospital practice can either be promoted or re-
tarded by the rules, in effect in the jurisdiction, establishing burden
of proof or requiring a special quantum of proof.
Whether the burden of disproving medical necessity, as defined
in the particular state statute, is on the state depends upon whether
that element is considered an exception to the statute or a proviso.
One state, Michigan,'23 relieves the prosecution by statute from any
123 Mc. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962).
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obligation to disprove necessity, and Illinois uses the terminology of
affirmative defense concerning the issue of necessity." 4 Other-
wise the matter has been left to judicial interpretation. Only two
courts have stated clearly and directly that the burden of proving
necessity is on the defendant;2 5 these cases are overbalanced by
decisions in fifteen other states which require the state to plead and
prove the want of necessity.'
If one's purpose is to encourage medical personnel in licensed
hospitals and clinics to develop their own concepts of what "life" or
"life and health" mean, the burden of proving non-necessity must re-
main with the state. A zealous prosecuting attorney would then
have to assume the obligation of establishing that the collective med-
ical judgment of those who authorized the abortion to be performed
in the hospital or clinic was itself not medically sound, an almost im-
possible burden for him to discharge. Several medical journals con-
tain descriptions of abortions which might not have met the statutory
tests for legality if they were tested in the courtroom but which were
approved openly in hospitals; 2 no prosecutions were brought,
which suggests that prosecutors are not anxious to lock horns with
the organized medical profession. Conversely, if one's aim is to dis-
courage activity by the medical profession, one should place the
burden of proving necessity on the doctor. He could probably do
so in many instances, but the fear of being called upon to prove
medical necessity (which contrasts strongly with the attitude of
"let the prosecuting attorney impeach the validity of our medical
124 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1963).
125Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Fitch v. People, 45
Colo. 298, 100 Pac. 1132 (1909).
126 People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); State v. Lee, 69 Conn.
186, 37 Ad. 75 (1897); State v. Brown, 26 Del. 499, 85 Ad. 797 (1912); Holloway v.
State, 90 Ga. App. 86, 82 S.E.2d 235 (1954); State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971,
221 N.W. 592 (1928); Commonwealth v. Stone, 300 Mass. 160, 14 N.E.2d 158
(1938); Ladnier v. State, 155 Miss. 348, 124 So. 432 (1929); State v. DeGroat, 259
Mo. 364, 168 S.W. 702 (1914); People v. Harrison, 40 Misc. 2d 601, 243 N.Y.S.2d
432 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Moody v. State, 17 Ohio St. 110 (1866); State v. Elliott, 206 Ore.
82, 289 P.2d 1075 (1955); State v. St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412, 52 A.2d 513 (1947); State
v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, 100 Pac. 681 (1909); State v. Montifoire, 95 Vt. 508, 116 Atl.
77 (1921); State v. Bates, 52 Wash. 2d 207, 324 P.2d 810 (1958). The Connecticut,
Oregon, and Washington decisions, however, hold that the state carries the burden by
proving that the woman was healthy immediately prior to the time the abortion was
performed.
127 Henker, Abortion and Sterilization From Psychiatric and Medico-Legal View-
points, 57 ARK. MEDICAL SOc'Y J. 368 (1961); May, Therapeutic Abortion in North
Carolina, 23 N.C. MEDICAL J. 547 (1962); Moore & Randall, Trends in Therapeutic
Abortion, 63 AMERICAN J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 28 (1952), Russell, Thera-




judgment if he wishes") is likely to encourage the timid to shun all
abortions. m Liberalization requires that the burden of proving non-
necessity remain with the state.
Mention has already been made of statutes and cases which re-
quire corroboration of the aborted woman's testimony in order for
there to be a conviction. It might be contended that this require-
ment be extended in order to encourage the performance of abor-
tions by licensed doctors in hospitals. This is not likely to be the
result achieved, however. If an abortion is performed after due con-
sultation, hospital records are almost certain to contain corroborating
documentation. It is also doubtful that the doctors who were con-
sulted in advance of the abortion could refuse to testify, unless pos-
sibly on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination, by
asserting that they might be charged as conspirators with the docfor
who in fact performed the abortion. The only type of defendant
who is likely to profit from the corroboration requirement is the
clandestine abortionist, and it is doubtful that anyone particularly
wants to encourage him in his practice.
B. Liberalized Scope For Therapeutic Abortion as
Defined in the Criminal Code
A second means of liberalizing the abortion law is to broaden
the scope of justifiable abortions in the criminal code itself. Men-
tion has already been made 2 ' of a few statutes which permit abor-
tions intended to preserve the health of the mother. To include this
alternative is certainly to encourage the performance of therapeutic
abortions in hospitals by licensed physicians; all hospital abortions
are in fact performed for health reasons. Whether the term "health"
includes psychic health is partly a medical and partly a legal issue.
It seems clear that many therapeutic abortions now performed are
motivated more by mental health considerations than by strictly
physiological considerations, although, of course, the two cannot be
totally separated. 3 ' Whether, however, a court will construe the
128 Ct. the cowed attitude of the medical profession toward administering narcotics
to hold an addict at the level of his addiction while he is being treated. LINDMSMITH,
THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 246-52, 254-66 (1965); RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIM-
INAL LAw 122-31 (1965). The reason is primarily the vigorous crusading and brow-
beating attitude of federal narcotics authorities.
129 See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
130 See Bolter, The Psychiatrist's Role in Therapeutic Abortion: The Unwitting
Accomplice, 119 AMERICAN J. OF PSYCHIATRY 312 (1962); Rosenberg & Silver, Sui-
cide, Psychiatrists and Therapeutic Abortion, 102 CAL. MEDICINE 407 (1965); Rosen-
berg & Silver, Psychiatric Therapeutic Abortion (abstract), 33 MODERN MEDICINE 256
(1965).
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statutory term "health" to include mental health is somewhat less
dear. About all one can cite in favor of a broad interpretation is a
portion of the charge in the famous case of Rex v. Bourne'3' and one
Iowa decision 3 ' in which the court described the aborted woman as
beiiig in a distraught condition, although in fact it decided the case
on a point of statutory construction. Unless the statute refers specifi-
cally to mental health, it is not at all dear that the word "health"
will be extended by judicial construction beyond "physical health."'33
No American statute authorizes an abortion to be performed on
eugenic grounds, i.e., based on the possibility that the fetus may be
born in a mentally or physically abnormal condition. No lawful re-
lief is, therefore, available to a woman who has contracted rubella 34
during the first trimester of pregnancy or who has taken thalido-
mide or other drugs which may produce deformed offspring." 5
Nor do American statutes take into account either the psycholog-
ical damage which may result to a woman if she is forced to carry to
term a child conceived through an act of rape (and the possible
non-adoptibility of the resulting child) or the fairly high possibility
that a child born of an incestuous relationship may be mentally re-
tarded.'36 If no relief is authorized in cases like these, it follows, of
course, that there is no authorization of abortions intended to pre-
vent either economic hardship to the family unit into which the child
will be born or diminution in the level of maternal care to be given
all of the children in the family. And there is not a shred of legal
basis for an abortion based on the convenience of the mother, what-
ever the personal considerations may be.
The drafters of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code
moved strongly to expand the scope of justifiable abortion beyond
its common form in the United States. Section 230.3.' defines
131 [1939] 1 K.B. 687, 694; Hudson v. Foster, [1939] 3 All E.R. 615, 619 ("that
the probable consequences of the continuance will be to make the woman a physical or
mental wreck").
132 State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928). The doctor ap-
parently acted because the woman "was in a highly nervous condition, and was threaten-
ing to kill herself, and was complaining of much pain." Id. at 972, 221 N.W. at 593.
133 If, however, the abortion is performed in a hospital after appropriate consulta-
tions, the chances of a prosecution are minimal. See the materials cited note 127 supra.
134 Commonly known as German measles.
135 The statutes cited at note 43 supra do not cover this situation, since abortion in
eugenic cases is intended to destroy, not preserve, the fetal life.
136 Taboos Against Incest Prove Well-Founded, 6 MEDICAL WORLD NEWS 94
(1965) reporting double the normal incidence of mental retardation anticipated on the
basis of classical genetic theory.
137 MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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justifiable abortion to be termination of a pregnancy by a licensed
physician on any of three grounds: (1) that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical and mental health of
the mother (this builds on the exception in the present Alabama
and District of Columbia statutes, and makes it dear that psychic
considerations can justify an abortion); (2) that the child would be
born with a grave physical or mental defect (this embodies eugenic
considerations not hitherto known in American law); and (3)
that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or, felonious inter-
course, defined to include illicit intercourse with a girl below
the age of sixteen. (This exception combines considerations of men-
tal and physical welfare of the pregnant woman with humanitarian
considerations. It is intended to embody considerations set out in
the Bourne case, and to prevent repetition of a case in which the
housewife victim of a rapist conceived and was forced to carry the
child to term because she could not obtain a lawful abortion.)...
However persuasive the arguments in support of the Model
Penal Code provisions may be to those who are pre-disposed to favor
liberalized abortion, they have so far been repudiated by state legis-
latures to which they have been submitted. The drafters of the pro-
posed Illinois Criminal Code advocated, like the proponents of the
Model Penal Code, that justifiable abortion include abortions
"medically advisable because continuance of the pregnancy would
endanger the life or gravely impair the health of the pregnant wom-
an" or because the fetus would be born with a "grave and irremedi-
able physical or mental defect" and abortions of women pregnant
through "forcible rape or aggravated incest."'39 The legislature, how-
ever, rejected the draft and limited the exception for justifiable
abortion to operations necessary to preserve the woman's life.14 The
authors of the Minnesota Criminal Code proposed that rape victims
be permitted an abortion if a complaint has been filed with prosecut-
ing authorities, and that therapeutic abortions be permitted, if per-
formed on the advice of two licensed physicians, "to save the life of
the mother, or to avoid grave impairment of the physical or mental
condition of the mother or to prevent the birth of a child with grave
138MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comment pp. 154-55 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
139 PROPOSED ILL. REV. CuM. CODE § 32-1 (Burdette-Smith Co. ed. 1961).
140 Ibid. The revised Committee Comments state: "Due to the opposition, and
criticism of the entire Code, encountered because of the inclusion of these affirmative
defenses to abortion, the Joint Committee agreed to their deletion and to the draft of
the section in its present adopted form."
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physical or mental defects."'' The legislature struck out the whole
chapter on sex crimes, including abortion, and preserved the exist-
ing statute which limits lawful abortions to those necessary to pre-
serve the life of the mother.'42 In New York the matter did not
progress even this far. The proposed penal law was drawn to include
as justification only the necessity "to preserve the life of the female
or of an unborn child with which she is pregnant, '143 though the re-
vision commission suggested that it still had the question of a more
liberal provision under advisement.'44 When the Revised Penal
Code was adopted, however, the only justifying factor retained was
necessity to save the life of the mother.'45 Efforts at liberalization
in New Hampshire are also reported to have failed in the legis-
lature.14
6
There are, however, two other ways in which the lot of the
medical profession may be improved even though no liberalization
of grounds for abortion is achieved. One is to make it explicit that
the doctor's belief in the necessity for the abortion is sufficient to
legitimize the abortion, even though after the fact it might appear
that from an objective point of view there was no necessity. This is
now the position taken in some of the StateS14--a position embodied
in the Model Penal Code as well. 48 Mention has already been made
of the qualification in the New York Revised Penal Law that the
belief be reasonable; 149 the Model Penal Code requires certificates
from two physicians and creates a presumption that the abortion
was unjustified unless the certificates are produced. 5 ° Either device
is preferable to a strict liability concept based on objective necessity.
The other method to improve the lot of the medical profession
is to set out, in the criminal code itself, procedures which a doctor
may follow to gain legal standing to commit a therapeutic abortion.
Some states now permit abortions to be performed if there is advice
or certification by physicians that an abortion is necessary.' 5 ' These
141 PROPOSED MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345 (West ed. 1963).
14 2 1 NN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964).
143 PROPOSED N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.05 (Thompson ed. 1964).
14 4 PROPOSED N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (Thompson ed. 1964) (Commission
Staff Notes).
145 N.Y. REV. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1965) (effective Sept. 1, 1967).
146 Ridgeway, One Million Abortions, New Republic, Feb. 9, 1963, p. 14.
147 See the text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
148 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
14 9 N.Y. REV. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1965) (effective Sept. 1,
1967).
150 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
151 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.10 (1965) ("advised by two physicians to be neces-
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provisions, however, do not give much assistance to doctors in
determining what procedures are appropriate in giving advice to the
physician or other person who performs the abortion; the qualify-
ing term "reputable" in the Mississippi statute adds another
complicating factor. A more detailed provision establishing basic
procedural norms is desirable. The chief question is whether de-
tailed procedural provisions belong in the criminal code 52 or
whether they should be placed among the statutes regulating the
medical profession and hospitals. The author believes the latter
preferable, in part because it is better not to clutter up the criminal
code with details which can just as easily be incorporated by refer-
ence from other statutes, and in part because changes in regulations
are more easily made when the legislature is asked by the profession
or group affected by a proposed change to amend the laws relating
to that profession or group than when it is the criminal code itself
which is sought to be changed.. However, any of the detailed pro-
visions discussed in the section which follows can as well be included
in the criminal code as in regulatory statutes.
C. Liberalized Abortion Authorized by Medical
Licensing Statutes
If in fact it is the medical profession, or segments of it, that
wishes liberalization of abortion laws, so that decisions to perform
dilitation and curettage, or other medical operations can be made
as any other medical determination might be, it seems appropriate
to make the primary legal context within which those decisions are
to be made that of the statutes regulating doctors and hospitals. On
the face of it, this has certain advantages. Interpretation of statu-
tory terms can be made within the framework of civil provisions
affecting the medical profession rather than the penal concepts of
the criminal code; this might lead to primacy of medical considera-
tions rather than penal. Furthermore, pressures from within the
sary"); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1953) ("advised by two physicians to be neces-
sary"); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-410 (Supp. 1963) ("advised by a physician to be
necessary"); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (1957) ("upon the prior advice, in writing, of
two reputable licensed physicians"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.100 (1953) ("advised by
a duly licensed physician to be necessary for such a purpose" if defendant not a physi-
dan; see the text accompanying note 35 supra); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404, 28-405
(1965) ("advised by two physicians to be necessary"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. S
585:13 (1955) (quick child only; "advised by two physicians to be necessary"); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-3 (1964) ("two [2) physicians who are licensed to practice in
this state, in consultation, deem it necessary"); OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.16 ("advised
by two physicians to be necessary").
152 An illustration is the legislation proposed in Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abor-
tion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 So. CAL. L. REv. 123, 146-48 (1962).
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medical profession for change can be exerted along familiar channels
to reach officials who are themselves members of that profession.
In theory, this should work changes more efficiently than if the same
energies are directed through non-existent or unfamiliar paths to-
ward laymen in the legislature. And, perhaps, it makes it crystal
clear that claims of medical necessity cannot be advanced in criminal
prosecutions by those who are not in the licensed group.
There are at least two ways in which this change of context can
be accomplished - one which has been tried and one which has not.
The first is to incorporate, either in the provisions governing revoca-
tion of medical licenses or as a part of the statutes regulating hospi-
tal practices in general, specific requirements for the performance
of therapeutic abortions. There are three states which have experi-
mented with this first alternative by setting up standards for consul-
tation which can be asserted as a defense to license revocation. Two
of them, Alabama and Louisiana, require only consultation, with-
out providing any further procedural details. " ' Oregon is the one
state which to date has sought to provide further guidelines. Medi-
cal doctors' and osteopaths' are given a standard -"health...
in peril because of her pregnant condition" -by which to make
their determinations and are also given procedures of consultation
and recording by which the basis for their decision can be ascertained
and perpetuated. 6 In confirmation of the monopoly of lawful
abortions by medical doctors and osteopaths, chiropractors 57 and
naturopaths 58 are specifically forbidden to perform abortions under
any circumstances.
153 ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 270 (Supp. 1963) ("before resorting to any of said meth-
ods of saving a woman's life the attending physician shall use diligence to obtain the
advice and help of one or more consulting physicians"; there is internal inconsistency
with the abortion statute itself, ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959), which legitimates abor-
tion done to preserve the woman's "life or health." Piecemeal amendment may be
the practical cause.) LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285 (1964) ("after due consultation
with another licensed physician").
154 ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.190 (1963).
155 ORE. REV. STAT. § 681.140 (1963).
156 ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.190 (1963). A medical doctor is required to have "due
consultation" with "another duly licensed medical physician and surgeon who is not
an associate or relative of the physician or surgeon and who agrees that an abortion is
necessary." ORE. REV. STAT. § 681.140 (1963). An osteopath is permitted consulta-
tion with "another duly licensed osteopathic or medical physician and surgeon who is
not an associate or relative." In either case, "the record of this consultation shall be in
writing and shall be maintained in the hospital where the consultation occurred or in
the offices of all the physicians and surgeons participating in the consultation for a
period of at least three years after the date of the abortion."
157 ORE. REV. STAT. § 684.100 (1963).
158 ORE. REV. STAT. § 685.110 (1963).
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No state has yet tried the second alternative, which is to place
the requirements for performance of a therapeutic abortion in the
affirmative context of statutes regulating hospitals rather than in
the negative context of license regulation. One state, California,
has experienced attempts to do this, though so far without success.
An ambitious regulatory statute, based on recommendations of two
law school professors, " ' was introduced in the California Legisla-
ture to establish minimum procedural requirements for the perform-
ance of therapeutic abortions. 6 ' The bill sought to permit hospital
"therapeutic abortion committees" of five members or more, to in-
clude at least two specialists in obstetrics, one in internal medicine
and one in psychiatry. Each committee was to be certified by the
State Department of Public Health. A physician wishing to perform
a therapeutic abortion was to file a written request supported by
written opinions of not less than two medical practitioners, one of
whom was to be a specialist in the field of medicine within the ambit
of which the stated basis for the abortion fell; these practitioners
could not be members of the committee. Written consent by the
woman and either her husband, if she were married, or her parent
or guardian, if she were not, also was to be submitted to the com-
mittee. If the committee approved, the abortion could then be per-
formed in the hospital.' The bill died in committee in both the
1961 and 1963 sessions; it was reported out of committee in the
1965 session, although it was thereafter referred to another com-
mittee, from which it was withdrawn by its sponsor for want of suf-
ficient support."'
A second approach to the problem - that of delegating the
decision-making to an appropriate administrative agency - has not
been attempted directly in the context of abortion, although it is
150 Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortions: A Problem in Law and Medicine,
11 STAN. L. REV. 417, 449-55 (1959).
100 It also proposed elimination from Penal Code coverage of any abortion per-
formed under the therapeutic abortion statute, and expansion of the grounds for abor-
tion to include pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or which created substantial risk
that the mother, or the child if born, would suffer grave and irremediable impairment
of physical or mental health. This corresponds closely to the Model Penal Code recom-
mendations described in the text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
161Two states, incidentally, now require that lawful abortions be performed in a
medical facility, though this requirement is in the criminal code provision. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, 5 23-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964) ("in a licensed hospital or other licensed
medical facility"); Wis. STAT. § 940.04 (1963) ("unless an emergency prevents, is
[to be] performed in a licensed maternity hospital").
162 Information supplied through the courtesy of Assemblyman John T. Knox, the
sponsor of the original bill. See also Kummer & Leavy, Therapeutic Abortion Law
Confusion, 195 A.M.AJ. 140, 143 (1966).
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well established in other areas. To achieve this, the criminal
code provision would be amended to exempt from its coverage (1)
any abortion necessary, or believed to be necessary by a licensed
physician, to preserve the life, or life or health if that is the existing
statutory phrase, of the pregnant woman, and (2) any therapeutic
abortion performed under duly promulgated regulations of the state
commissioner of hospitals, department of health, or whatever (de-
pending on the state), embodying (a) medical grounds for thera-
peutic abortion and (b) general hospital procedures governing per-
formance of therapeutic abortions. The first part of the proposal
is necessary to prevent construction of the amended statute as
retroactive in coverage; abortions lawful prior to amendment of
the penal code section would continue to be lawful afterwards. The
second part would leave extension of the concept of therapeutic
abortions to administrative regulation.
If there are constitutional problems inherent in this scheme,
they are within the field of administrative law and not criminal law.
There is no delegation of power to determine affirmative criminal
norms; any regulations promulgated by the specified state agency
would inure to the benefit of a defendant doctor and not to his
detriment. Most case law appears to support the power of the legis-
lature to delegate norm-creating functions to administrative bodies.'63
Regulation of the professions has been consistently upheld in the
face of claims of denial of equal protection or due process;... only
if regulation of medical practice is delegated to a private agency is
there any major problem. 6" Accordingly, it would appear that ex-
perimentation along these lines could readily survive constitutional
attack.
Would delegating legislation make any practical difference in
the availability of safe therapeutic abortion through medical chan-
nels? In the abstract it has advantages. It gives members of the
medical profession the opportunity of making gradual alterations
in hospital practices based on expanded medical knowledge; specifics
are not encysted in statutes. Changes would be promulgated by an
agency largely composed of members of the medical profession, and
163 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.04-2.15 (1959).
164 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114 (1889); State ex rel. Bond v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 209 Ala. 9, 95 So.
295 (1923).
1 65 See Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963), modified




thus in one sense answerable to it. Amendments of norms are more
quickly and easily accomplished by administrative agencies than by
the legislature itself. There is not the same likelihood of campaigns
in the press about the morality of abortions, campaigns which have
occurred each time liberalization of the abortion provisions in state
criminal codes has been attempted. The total impact ought to be
a transition toward exercise of considered medical opinion in place
of gladiatorial combat.
In fact, however, this legislation or any other legislation which
ties issues of therapeutic abortion to the regulation of the medical
profession in general is likely to be of little immediate effect. One
reason is the extreme conservatism of the medical doctors who staff
state agencies, hospital boards, and committees of state and local
medical societies. Breezes of reform chill these leaders even more,
if that is possible, than their counterparts in the legal profession.
It might well be two generations before any impact could be made
on their armor of conservatism.
But there is probably a more basic reason. For generations
much of the medical profession has been able to avoid coming to
grips with the problem of abortion because it has had the ready
excuse that discussion of liberalized therapeutic abortion is moot as
long as the penal law of the state forbids it. At the same time,
however, it has apparently tolerated the marginal practitioners who
perform the abortions which its more prestigious members shun out
of fear or distaste; the medical profession, as well as the legal, has
its prostitutes. 6' The primary reason why most doctors shun abor-
tions is because of their view of themselves as preservers of life;
abortion creates, although perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree than
the related problem of euthanasia, a real tension between the physi-
cian's desire to preserve life and his awareness that by performing
an abortion he is terminating life. When he practices in a field of
medicine in which he sees the hardships which refusal to perform an
abortion works on his pregnant patients, he probably arrives by
stages at a satisfactory accommodation between his abstract image
of himself as a healer and preserver of life and his feelings as to what
the best interests of his patients require. Certainly, the strongest
advocates of liberalized abortion are specialists in gynecology, obstet-
160 Dr. George L. Timanus was a defendant in the case of Adams v. State, 200 Md.
133, 88 A.2d 556 (1951). See his complaint that doctors who had referred patients
to him were unwilling to come forward and testify at his trial. ABORTION IN THE
UNITED STATEs 62-63 (Calderone ed. 1958). This looks very much like the "status
dilemma" described in CARUN, LAWYERS ON THEiR OWN 173-84 (1962).
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rics, and psychiatry, who encounter pregnant women as persons and
not as a non-specific class. To make the medical profession face
the fact that it has its own responsibility to determine where it
stands on the issue of therapeutic abortions, which is what results
from elimination of the problem from the coverage of the criminal
code, is to place it in a position of stress and trauma. One might
expect no very great increase in the number of therapeutic abortions
actually performed, and a very great effort to defer the problem
to some other segment of the community, like welfare agencies or
the legal profession, so that the medical profession can avoid these
internal and external pressures. These efforts ought to be resisted;
for if the problem rests with medicine for solution, the medical pro-
fession will be forced to recognize that the abortion dilemma is as
much its own responsibility to resolve as it is that of any other
group in society. In that event, perhaps it will begin to reconsider
its attitudes toward abortion in the same way the legal profession
has begun to reconsider its attitudes with respect to the practice of
criminal law.
IV. CONCLUSION
To continue the present restrictive laws on abortion is to pur-
chase the illusion of security at the cost of considerable human loss.
Enforcement of criminal statutes in their present form may accom-
plish about all the protection possible against untrained abortionists,
but with corresponding disadvantages which perhaps more than
offset the gains. These disadvantages are the harassment of the
medical profession by zealous prosecutors, and the creation of in-
tolerable tension in the doctor who is torn between his desire to
perform an abortion, which he believes to be necessary on humani-
tarian grounds, and his fear of performing it because it is illegal.
In the long run the best way to salvage pregnant women from the
hands of unqualified abortionists is to make it possible for them to
receive proper treatment, openly, in licensed hospitals. This can be
achieved by liberalizing the definition of justifiable therapeutic
abortion in the criminal code or by incorporating by reference
similar expanded provisions in statutes or regulations affecting the
medical profession directly. Doctors will face considerable emotional
crisis if the second avenue is followed; ingrained emotional expecta-
tions and traditions in society make the former difficult to ac-
complish. If neither alternative is attempted, however, doctors and
lawyers must bear on their own consciences the injustices inherent
in the present law.
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